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WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 1 January 1972


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NSA review completed


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SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1972
Weekly average for each month




OCTOBER 1971 - JANUARY 1972
Weekly data as reported



increased from last week's one to two.


SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS



dropped to 136 from the 174 of last week. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN.


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INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE




during the week include two regular [redacted] totaling some 1,710 personnel. The number of infiltrators noted moving toward South Vietnam and Cambodia since 1 October 1971 is now an estimated 37,000-39,000.

ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS




declined to 204 from last week's 223.

ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION




dropped to 874 from the 1,135 of last week.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS



as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces dropped from last week's 95% to 94%.

Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary



Enemy Activity

In Laos, the Communists commenced the assault on the base at Long Tieng on 31 December 1971 with heavy artillery barrages from their 130mm field guns located just south of the Plaine des Jarres (PDJ). From these positions, these guns are operating near the end of their maximum effective range (approximately 17 miles). Damage has been impressive to storage and administrative facilities at Long Tieng, but the air strip remains open to light fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. As other air operations had been shifted earlier to Ban Son (Site 272) southwest of Long Tieng, resupply of fighting forces in place around Long Tieng has not been seriously impaired. Five to eight 130mm guns are estimated to be bombarding Long Tieng with perhaps as many as three others having been hit by tactical air since the shelling of Long Tieng commenced. Locating these guns -- and neutralizing them by air strikes -- has been difficult because of poor weather conditions over MR II and skillful deception efforts by enemy gun crews. The Communist infantry effort against Long Tieng's defensive line north and east of Long Tieng has, so far, been confined to light clashes designed to probe the screen, now manned by some 8,000 - 9,000 friendly troops. North of the PDJ, Bouam Long (Site 32) has received light and sporadic attacks by fire, but for the moment a full-scale ground assault does not appear imminent. Preliminary friendly casualty figures available as of 2 January give irregular losses for the 17-20 December attacks on the PDJ as 286 killed, 418 wounded, and 800 - 1,500 unaccounted for.

Elsewhere in Laos, enemy activity around Luang Prabang has been confined to light patrolling activity, while in MR III the situation around Dong Hene remains quiet. In MR IV, on 27 December, friendly forces walked out of Paksong under enemy pressure, abandoning four 105mm howitzers. Subsequently, government troops retreated from defensive positions some five miles west of the town, leaving behind another three 105mm howitzers. The government defensive line now is fixed at Ban Gnik on the western edge of the Bolovens Plateau.

Enemy-initiated activity in South Vietnam has continued at low levels and has consisted primarily of scattered attacks by fire and small ground probes. Although there is nothing at this time suggesting that any significant change is imminent, all source intelligence makes it appear that the enemy may be building up his strength in northern MR 1 and the Central Highlands of MR 2 for a major effort. Possibly as many as two North Vietnamese divisions -- the 304th and 308th -- may be moving to the DMZ, and a third -- the 324-B -- may be deploying to Military Region Thua Thien Hue (MRTTH). Meanwhile, [redacted] the North Vietnamese 320th Division is moving toward the Western Highlands of MR 2. Reports from [redacted] ralliers and prisoners suggest that a possible time for major tactical activity will be about the time of the Lunar New Year (Tet), which occurs in mid-February.

Enemy-initiated activity in Cambodia has been at low levels and has consisted primarily of harassment of FANK forces with attacks by fire and small ground probes. ARVN forces engaged in Operation TOAN THANG 01/71 have been reduced by several thousand men and while the operation continues to grind along there have been no major contacts or significant developments reported.

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South Vietnam Developments

Reportedly, the South Korean Government is moving closer to a decision not to keep its two full-strength divisions in Vietnam through 1972, as requested by the Thieu government. This stance may be a bargaining position. A representative of the South Korean Foreign Ministry implied, however, that the retention of some ROK forces during this period could probably be negotiated. The two Korean infantry divisions, totaling some 40,000 men, are currently deployed in the coastal areas of MR 2. Although they have not been operating aggressively in recent months, their departure would at least temporarily weaken the security of the region.

Communist Developments

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Several Communist prisoners, ralliers, [redacted] have indicated that plans for an upsurge in military activity in January and around Tet in mid-February are to be related to external and possibly new diplomatic developments. [redacted]

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[redacted] offensive

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action will occur when President Nixon travels to Peking. [redacted] COSVN had issued a directive to various echelons aimed at motivating personnel to carry out the "highpoint" which is designed in part to achieve a political solution to the war based on Mme. Binh's 7-point proposals. However, [redacted]

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[redacted] the planned "highpoint" phase around Tet will be accompanied by several new Communist proposals at the Paris talks. According to the source, the new proposals will be aimed at improving the Communist negotiating image and at putting more pressure on the U.S.-GVN side to accept a coalition government. (It is possible that any updating or revision of the July 1971 7-point package would be heralded either by Mme. Binh or Le Duc Tho on their return to Paris.)

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